A San Francisco transcription company that handles audio for police departments, prosecutors, government agencies and several large technology firms has closed a publicly accessible cloud storage bucket that was serving up its customers' work to anyone who found the address. The bucket belonged to Tigerfish and contained transcriptions of police interviews, body-camera recordings, clients' raw audio and video files, and invoices that named the police departments and prosecutors' offices on the customer list.
The files sat on an Amazon-hosted S3 server that was openly listed and reachable through an easy-to-guess web address, with no password required, according to security researcher Anurag Sen, who found the data. Sen, who has spent a decade hunting exposed datasets from his home in Indonesia and describes the work as being an "unpaid air-traffic controller," discovered the material in October and emailed the company. He received no reply, and later passed the details to TechCrunch to get the exposure resolved.
Tigerfish secured the bucket shortly after the publication contacted it. "We've blocked all public access to the bucket you identified, including directory listings and individual files," company president Adam Goldberg said in an email. "We've also verified that all of our other S3 buckets are blocked to public access." He added that the firm is reviewing and strengthening its storage security more broadly. Tigerfish said Sen's original disclosure was caught by its spam filter. It did not answer a follow-up email, and it is not clear whether affected customers have been told.
The volume of data involved has not been disclosed, which matters more than usual for this kind of leak. Transcription records for law enforcement carry witness identities, interview content and case detail, and body-camera video is among the most sensitive material a police agency produces. Invoices add a second layer: they show which agencies and companies rely on the vendor, information that is useful to anyone mapping a supply chain for later targeting.
The incident is a reminder that the fastest route into sensitive data is still a misconfigured setting rather than a clever exploit. Sen said most of what he finds comes down to basic human error, such as an engineer spinning up a test database before a weekend, switching off authentication to test an API, and forgetting to restore it. "Everyone often fears shadowy hackers," he said, but the real problem is leaving systems "wide open to the public internet without a password."
Cloud providers have been tightening defaults in response. Amazon has made it harder to create a public S3 bucket without navigating explicit multi-step warnings, and newer development platforms including Lovable and Supabase have added similar guardrails. Those changes reduce the frequency of the simplest mistake without eliminating it, particularly at vendors where storage is configured once and rarely revisited.
What the case exposes is a procurement gap. Agencies that hand evidence-grade audio to an outside vendor typically audit the vendor's accuracy and turnaround, and far less often its bucket policies, retention settings and access logs. The question a contract should answer is not whether a supplier says its storage is private, but who verified that, when, and what the supplier does when a researcher reports that it is not.
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